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Minutes before he was to be hanged in a public square in Iran,
seventeen-year-old Morteza Amini Moqaddam ("Moqaddam") was forgiven
by the father of his murder victim.1 Under Iran's Islamic legal system, the
relatives of the victim determine whether or not a convicted murderer is to
die. The Qur'an, Islam's holy book, states: "The recompense for an injury
/ Is an injury equal thereto / (In degree): but if a person / Forgives and
makes reconciliation, / His reward is due / From Allah."2 After
Moqaddam's family and many of the four-thousand spectators at the public
hanging pleaded with the victim's family to forgive Moqaddam in the name
of Islam, Ali Mohebbi, the victim's father, told authorities to spare the
young man's life.' The noose was then removed, from Moqaddam's neck,
and he was taken back to prison for later resentencing. Moqaddam was
transported in the ambulance that had been waiting to take his body to the
morgue.' Mohebbi told reporters that he decided to forgive his son's killer
for the honor of Islam:' "If I forgave him, maybe millions of people who
would watch the news would learn about forgiveness-and that is the mes-
sage of Islam.... When I saw his hands cuffed behind him and the noose
around his neck and everyone was waiting for my order, I thought that first
of all if this boy is dead, it will not bring back my son."6
There is no similarly demarcated place nor such a formal mechanism
in the Anglo-American criminal justice system, particularly in a capital
murder proceeding, for forgiveness. In the United States, a crime is under-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Washington & Lee University School of Law; M.A.
Boston University; B.A., Evergreen State College.
1. Afshin Valenejad, Iranian Victim's Dad Spares Life of Teen Killer, Ci. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2000, at 18, available in 2000 WL 6663045.
2. The Qur'an, Ash-Sh jra 42:40.
3. Valenejad, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (internal quotation marks ommitted).
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stood in terms of "social harm," and the injury suffered involves "a breach
and violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community,
considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity."7 While civil
law recognizes the rights of private parties to seek redress for harm suffered
in the courts, our criminal law is public law, and a criminal wrong is prose-
cuted by a public attorney who represents the state rather than the victim.
The criminal proceeding is brought to protect the public interest rather than
to compensate the individual victim or the family of the victim.'
Given that we recognize crime as a public harm, how do we then
account for the possibility of individual forgiveness on the part of the family
of the victim, specifically in a capital murder case? Does the kind of forgive-
ness exhibited by Ali Mohebbi toward Morteza Amini Moqaddam exist in
the Anglo-American criminal justice system? Does the victim's family
under our system have the same authority to affect change in the proceed-
ings as did Mohebbi? At what point in the proceedings can or does such
forgiveness enter into a capital case? Can evidence of forgiveness on the part
of the victim's family mean the difference between the death penalty and life
in prison without parole for the murderer? Should such evidence be given
a formal and uniform position in our criminal justice system? In seeking to
answer the foregoing questions, this article will begin by tracing the roles of
a number of victims' families at different stages in capital murder cases as a
means of understanding the nature of this involvement in terms of the
criminal justice system. It will then explore the meaning of the term
"forgiveness" and will distinguish this concept from the related concept of
mercy. It will then examine the current state of victim impact evidence law
at the national level and in Virginia specifically. Finally, this article will
conclude with an evaluation of the ways in which forgiveness by a murder
victim's family might be used in defending a capital case in Virginia should
such evidence be found.
II. Forgiveness on the Part of Victim's Families
At a recent conference entitled "The Role of Forgiveness in the Law,"
Jeffrie G. Murphy stated:
I think that one of the most insightful discussions of forgiveness ever
penned is to be found in Bishop Joseph Butler's 1726 sermon "Upon
Forgiveness of Injuries." In that sermon, Bishop Butler offers a defini-
tion of forgiveness that I have adapted in my own work on the topic.
According to Butler, forgiveness is a moral virtue (a virtue of character)
that is essentially a matter of the heart, the inner self, and involves a
change in inner feeling more than a change in external action. The
7. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2d ed. 1995) (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5).
8. WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 12-13 (2d. ed. 1986).
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change in feeling is this: the overcoming, on moral grounds, of the
intense negative reactive attitudes-the vindictive passions of resentment,
anger, hatred, and the desire for revenge-that are quite naturally occa-
sioned when one has been wronged by another responsible agent. A
person who has forgiven has overcome those vindictive attitudes and has
overcome them for a morally creditable motive-e.g., being moved by
repentance on the part of the person by whom one has been wronged.9
There are certainly stories of the kind of forgiveness Murphy describes
by murder victims' family members in capital cases in the United States.
Maria Hines, sister of murdered Virginia state trooper Jerry Hines, not only
forgave her brother's killer, Dennis Wayne Eaton, but also visited him in
prison, corresponded with him, and lobbied on his behalf in his plea for
executive clemency.1" Jerry Hines was shot during a traffic stop of Eaton
and his girlfriend, Judy Ann McDonald, on Feb. 21, 1989." Hines pulled
over the car in which Eaton and McDonald were riding on suspicion of
drunken driving. He did not know that Eaton had killed two men the day
before. 12 Hines, forty-eight, was shot twice and died beside the highway.
Eaton maintained that McDonald killed Hines, but a jury found Eaton
responsible for the trooper's death.'4 After Hines was shot, McDonald and
Eaton fled, leading Salem police on a high-speed chase that ended when
Eaton crashed into a telephone pole. 5 Eaton then shot and killed McDon-
ald in what he later claimed was a suicide pact, and finally turned the gun on
himself.'6 Rather than killing himself, however, he succeeded only in
9. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Remarks at "The Role of Forgiveness in the Law" Symposium
5 (January 28, 2000) (citing BISHOP JOSEPH BUTLER, SERMONS OF JOSEPH BUTLER 127-41
(W.E. Gladstone ed. 1897)) (transcript on file with author).
10. Dianne Aprile, More Humane Punishment is the Goal of Victim's Kin, COuRIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), June 14, 1998, at 01H, available in 1998 WL 2106445.
11. Matt Chittum, Crime and Punishment... and Forgiveness as Trooper's Killer Faces
Execution, the Victim's Family Faces Its Feelings, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, June 13,
1998, at A1, available in 1998 WL 5903650.
12. Spencer S. Hsu, Victim's Sister Urges Clemency; Plea to Spare Trooper's Killer Comes
as Court Rejects Appeal, WASH. POST, June 17, 1998, at B04, available in 1998 WL 11586797.
13. Id.
14. Chittum, supra note 11. Maria Hines also believes that Eaton killed her brother.
She nevertheless forgave him:
It "really doesn't make any difference to me who fired the gun. To me, he did
the other murders that led to them [Eaton and McDonald] comin down (Inter-
state) 81 when Jerry stopped them. So, ultimately, he's involvecin his death."
... "And that's what I have forgven him for, all of that. Whether he actually
fired the gun or not is irrelevant.
Frank Green, Begging His Pardon; Sister of Slain Trooper Wants to Save Condemned Killer,
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blowing out his right eye."7 Eaton was found guilty of capital murder and
was sentenced to death on January 10, 1990.8
While Maria Hines had long been opposed to the death penalty, she did
not become involved in Eaton's case until 1997, when she decided to write
Eaton to let him know that she had forgiven him. In a December 1, 1997
letter, Hines, a former Catholic nun, wrote:
[H]ell has been defined as the absence of love and, likewise, with hatred
instead of love in my heart, my life would be a living hell. So forgiving
you is not only for you but also for me-and what it would do to my
own soul if I refused to forgive.
19
Hines said that she had forgiven Eaton because "killing is wrong, whether
it's a case of one individual killing another or if it's a state killing one of its
citizens .... I want other victims to know there is an alternative. That
alternative is forgiveness and reconciliation."2"
The adult children of murder victim Jose M. Cavazos also forgave their
father's killer, Lonnie Weeks, Jr." Cavazos, a Virginia State Trooper, was
shot to death after he stopped the car in which Weeks was riding for speed-
ing.22 Cavazos was hit by two nine millimeter hollow-point bullets, and like
Jerry Hines, he too died at the side of the highway.23 Weeks was convicted
17. Id.
18. Green, supra note 14.
19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Hsu, supra note 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Maria Hines has no
illusions that her brother would have opposed capital punishment the way she does:
"Jerry was a police officer and many police officers do think that someone who
kills a police officer should be executed." But she said, "The only reason that
Dennis is being executed is because he did kill a police officer and it does not
honor my brother to kill in his name. Rather it dishonors him."
Green, supra note 14. Hines's widow and children have not forgiven Eaton. Id. Marie
Deans, founder of Murder Victims Families for Reconciliation, a national 
organization of
family members of victims of both homicides and state killings who oppose the death penalty
in all cases, states:
After a murder, victims' families face two things: a death and a crime. At these
times, families need help to cope with their grief and loss and support to heal
their hearts and rebuild their lives. From experience, we know that revenge is
not the answer. The answer lies in reducing violence, not causing more death.
The answer lies in supporting those who grieve for their lost loved ones, not
creating more grieving families. It is time we break the cycle of violence. To
those who say society must take a life for a life, we say: 'not in our name."
Marie Deans, Murder Victims Families for Reconciliation (last modified Sept. 5, 1999)
< http://www.mvfr.org >.
21. Frank Green, Court Stays Execution of Weeks; Judge's Refusal to Answer Jury's





of capital murder and sentenced to death.24 Cavazos's children joined in
Weeks's efforts to obtain clemency from Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore.
The clemency petition Weeks filed was based largely on letters from the
Cavazos children, who said that they forgave Weeks and were asking that
the Governor commute his sentence to life in prison.26 In a letter to the
Governor, Leslie Cavazos-Almagi, Jose Cavazos's twenty-six-year-old
daughter, wrote: "[Pilease take into consideration the feelings my brother
and I have in this matter. We have thought about this very carefully. In
our hearts we have forgiven all that has been done to our family. " 2' To
Weeks, Cavazos-Almagi wrote: "Lonnie, I forgive you for what you have
done. Unfortunately, your fate is out of my hands."" Trevor Cavazos, Jose
Cavazos's twenty-two-year-old son, voiced his opposition to the death
penalty in a letter to Governor Gilmore:
I truly believe that the state is making a "God"-like decision that in no
way can be proven to be divine, or backed up by "God." If we as human
beings truly believe that killing is wrong, then how can we say that
punishing a person accused of killing should be solved by killing that
person?
There are also stories of forgiveness fromplaces other than Virginia.
Marietta Jaeger forgave the man who abducted from a tent, raped, and then
killed her seven-year-old daughter during a family camping trip in
Montana. 0 Jaeger says:
I've come to understand that God's idea for us is not vengeance but
restoration.... Jesus came to forgive, to heal.... How do we best
honor the memory of a loved one? Doesn't she deserve a more beautiful
memorial than killing a chained, restrained, defenseless person? How
does that provide peace for the victim's family?"
Bud Welch's twenty-three-year-old daughter Julie was killed in the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and he has forgiven Timothy McVeigh.
3 2
24. Id.
25. Id. Jose Cavazos's wife did not believe that Weeks's sentence should be commuted.
Id.
26. Id.
27. Frank Green, Will Letters Help Spare Killer's Life.?; Children of Slain Trooper Seek
Mercy, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 1999, at A 1, available in 1999 WL 4363783 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Robert McClory, How I Came to Forgive the Unforgivable, U.S. CATH. (Chicago),
Aug. 1, 1998, at 10, available in 1998 WL 14597542.
31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. David Pallister, 'Spare the Life of My Loved One's Killer" Murder Victims'Families
Speak Out Against U.S. Death Penalty, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 9, 1999, at D1, available
in 1999 WL 25737925. SeealsoJim Belshaw, Retribution, Forgiveness, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Feb.
2000]
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After nine months of wanting vengeance, Welch asked himself what the
death penalty was going to do for him: "It wasn't going to bring Julie back.
I recognized it was revenge and hate-and that it was revenge and hate that
had killed Julie."33 So, too, has Sue Zann Bosler forgiven the man who
stabbed her father, the Reverend Billy Bosler, to death in front of her and
left her for dead.34 Ms. Bosler describes the day she forgave James Campbell,
her father's murderer, as "the happiest day of my life .... I felt a sense of
relief, and peace overcame me inside.""
IX. Forgiveness and Mercy
What these family members of murder victims describe is a change in
their feelings about the person who committed the murder. At what point
in the proceedings can such forgiveness enter into a capital case? Does our
criminal justice system take into account forgiveness on the part of the
victim's family? In order to ascertain whether family forgiveness plays a
role in capital cases in the United States, it is first important to understand
specifically what is meant by forgiveness and then to distinguish this term
from the related concept of mercy. Jeffrie G. Murphy draws a distinction
between forgiveness and mercy in terms of "feeling" and "treating" that is
helpful in understanding how these two concepts operate in the Anglo-
American criminal justice system. Murphy writes:
[F]orgiveness is primarily a matter of changing how one/eels with respect
to a person who has done one an injury ... It is, in my view, particu-
larly a matter of overcoming, on moral grounds, the resentment a self-
respecting person quite properly feels when suffering such an injury.
Mercy, though related to forgiveness, is clearly different in at least these
two respects. First, to be merciful to a person requires not merely that
one change how one feels about that person but also a specific kind of
action (or omission).-namely, treating that person less harshly than, in
the absence of mercy, one would have treated him. Second, it is not a
requirement of my showing mercy that I be an injured party. All that
is required is that I stand in a certain relation to the potential beneficiary
4, 2000, at D1, available in 2000 WL 11981017. Belshaw reports on the forgiveness of Peter
and Linda Biehl, who forgave the three men who beat and stabbed their daughter Amy to
death in South Africa in 1993. The Biehls traveled to South Africa to testify in support of
freeing the three killers, and during that trip they came to know not only the families of the
men who had killed their daughter, but the men themselves. David Biehl stated:
We can speak only from our own experience, but I can tell you for an absolute
fact that we have seen with our own eyes the importance of restorative rather
than retributive justice.... We have bKeen through it ourselves and personally
experienced how liberating it truly can be to forgive and to attempt to reconcile.
Id.
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of mercy. This relation-typically established by legal or other institu-
tional rules-makes it appropriate that I impose some hardship upon the
potential beneficiary of mercy. 6
While the family of a murder victim might forgive the person responsible
for a family member's death, mercy is that which is granted by the state. A
murder victim's family has "standing,"37 in Murphy's terms, to forgive, but
it does not have the legal authority to "treat" that guilty person in any way.
Only the state has the authority to punish the murderer or to grant that
murderer mercy. Thus, whereas Ali Mohebbi was able, in forgiving
Morteza Amini Moqaddam, to trigger an automatic grant of mercy from the
state in Iran, the family of the victim has no such certain power in the
United States.3"
IV The Current State of Victim Impact Evidence Law
It is not the case, however, that the family that forgives has no power
in the Anglo-American criminal justice system. Support for victims' rights
has been growing over the past three decades, and as a result of the Victim
Witness and Protection Act of 1982"9 and the Victim's Rights and
36. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 167 (1988)
(emphasis added). Murphy writes:
Forgiveness is primarily a matter of how I feel about you (not how I treat you),
and thus I may forgive you in my heart of hearts or after you are dead ....I may
think I have forgiven you; but when old resentments rise up arain, I may say, I
was wrong-I really have not torgiven you after all." But if Ihave shown you
mercy it is not necessary that -in sliowing it-must be the one wronged or
injured by your wrongfl conduct. (It is not even necessary that anyone be
wronged.) All that is required is that you stand under certain rules and that I
have authority to treat you in a certain harsh way because of those rules. But the
matter is different with forgiveness. To use a legal term, I do not have standing
to resent or forgive you unfess I have myself been the victim of your wrongdo-
ing.
Id. at 20-21.
37. Id. at 21.
38. While it may not always be the case that forgiving families advocate against the
death penalty, this article is concerned wih cases of forgiveness that give rise to requests for
mercy. According to Jeffrie G. Murphy, "the virtue of mercy is revealed when a person, out
of compassion for the hard position of the person who owes him an obligation, waives the
right that generates the obligation and frees the individual of the burden of that obligation."
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 36, at 176. In relation to criminal law, Murphy asserts:
(Because] individuals may legitimately show mercy by waiving their rights, a
judge or any other officiil may exercise mercy in a criminal case if(and this is a
very big "if") it can be shown that such an official is acting, not merely on his
own sentiments, but as a vehicle for expressing the sentiments of all those who
have been victimized by the criminal, and who, given those sentiments, wish to
waive the right that each has that the criminal be punished.
Id. at 179-80. Mercy is triggered by forgiveness, but if the stories of forgiveness are not heard,
then the court's exercise of its power to grant mercy is restricted.
39. 18 U.S.C. S 1512 (1988).
2000]
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Restitution Act of 1990,' victims of crime and their families now have a
definite presence in criminal proceedings.41 The aim of the legislation on
behalf of victims was to accord witnesses and victims a greater degree of
rights and protections in the criminal justice system and to ensure that
victims had the right to be notified of, and present at, court proceedings, to
be kept apprised of the status of such factors as the defendant's conviction,
sentencing, imprisonment, and release, and to present evidence of the
impact of the crime at trial.4' In-Virginia, the "Crime Victim and Witness
Rights Act," passed in 1995, seeks to ensure that victims and witnesses "have
the opportunity to be heard by law-enforcement agencies, attorneys for the
Commonwealth, corrections agencies and the judiciary at all critical stages
of the criminal justice process to the extent permissible under law."43
Prior to 1991, victim impact evidence was not allowed in capital
murder trials. In Booth v. Maryland," the United States Supreme Court held
that the use of victim impact statements describing a victim's personal
characteristics, the impact of the crime on the victim's family, and the
family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes was
40. 42 U.S.C. S 10606(b) (1995).
41. Beth E. Sullivan, Harnessing Payne: Controlling the Admission of Victim Impact
Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearings From Passion and Prejudice, 25 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 601, 609-15 (1998).
42. Id. There are numerous and very persuasive arguments against the introduction of
victim impact statements in the courtroom, particularly in capital murder trials. See, e.g.,
Sullivan, supra note 41; Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63
U. CI. L. REV. 361 (1996); Amy K. Phillips, Tbou Shalt Not Kill Nice People: The Problem
of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93 (1997); Ashley
Paige Dugger, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A History oflncompatibility, 23
AM.J. CRIM. L. 375 (1996); Cecil A. Rhodes, The Victim Impact Statement and Capital Crimes:
Trials ByJury and Death By Character, 21 S.U. L. REV.1 (1994); Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices
in Criminal.Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (1991); Douglas R.
Banghart, A Quarter Century of Death: A Symposium on Capital Punishment in Virginia since
Furman v. Georgia: Vileness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 77 (1999). While this article
recognizes as valid the arguments against victim impact statements, it does not seek to
challenge the admissibility of such evidence. Rather, the focus here is on using such
procedures as are already in place to admit evidence of forgiveness.
43. VA. CODEANN. S 19.2-11.01 (Michie 1999). Section 19.2-11.01(B) defines victim"
as the following:
(i) a person who has suffered physical, psychological or economic harm as a direct
result of the commission of a felony or of an assault and battery in violation of
S18.2-57, 8.2-57. or 18.2-57.2, stalking in violation of 5 18.2-60.3, sexualy violation of 18.2-67.4, attemptedsexual battery in violation of 18.2-
67.5, maiming or driving while intoxicated in violation of S 18.2-51.4 or S 18.2-
266, (ii) a spouse or child of such a person, (iii) a parent or legal guardian of such
a person who is a minor, or (iv) a spouse, parent or legal guardian of such a
person who is physically or mentally incapacitated or was the victim of a
homicide.
VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-11.01(B) (Michie 1999).
44. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
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unconstitutional." The Court found that the admission of such evidence
"creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the
death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner."' In Payne v.
Tennessee,47 however, the Court held that "if the State chooses to permit the
admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that
subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar."48 The Payne Court
overruled Booth to the extent that Booth prohibited the use of victim impact
evidence describing the personal characteristics of victims and the emotional
impact of the crimes on victims' families.49 Accepting the Payne Court's
decision in Weeks v. Commonwealth,s° the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the trial court's admission of victim impact evidence."1 The court
rejected Weeks's argument that the testimony was not relevant to the jury's
sentencing decision. 2 Citing Payne, the court held that "victim impact
testimony is relevant to punishment in a capital murder prosecution in
Virginia."" While Weeks held that such evidence was admissible because it
was relevant, in Beck v. Commonwealth,"4 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that such testimony is admissible ifit is relevant. According to the Beck
Court, victim impact testimony might come from persons other than family
members.55 The court explained:
[T]he statutes [19.2-11.01, 19.2-264.5, and 19.2-299.1] do not limit
evidence of victim impact to that received from the victim's family
members. Rather, the circumstances of the individual case will dictate
what evidence will be necessary and relevant, and from what sources it
may be drawn. In a capital murder trial, as in any other criminal
proceeding, the determination of the admissibility of relevant evidence
is within the sound discretion of the trial court subject to the test of
abuse of that discretion.'
Evidence of victim impact should be distinguished from evidence of the
opinion of a victim's family member that the death penalty should not be
imposed. Evidence of a family member's opposition to the death penalty
has been disallowed in capital cases in a number of jurisdictions. In Robison
45. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 503-09 (1987).
46. Id. at 503.
47. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
48. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
49. Id.
50. 450 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1994).
51. Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (Va. 1994).
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 808 (1991)).
54. 484 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1997).
55. Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1997).




v. Maynard," the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
considered whether Payne requires that testimony from a victim's relative
that she did not want the jury to impose the death penalty was proper
mitigating evidence and admissible at the penalty phase hearing."8 The court
held that Payne did not make such evidence proper or admissible: 9
Simply put, Payne merely put aside the bar to the introduction of and
comment upon victim impact evidence which had been created in Booth
and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 104 L. Ed. 2d 876, 109 S. Ct.
2207 (1989). The Court did not expand the universe of admissible
relevant mitigating evidence established by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).... We cannot agree that
Payne portends admissibility of any evidence other than that related to
the victim and the impact of the victim's death on the members of the
victim's family. Nothing said by the Court suggests the Court intended
to broaden the scope of relevant mitigating evidence to include the
opinion of a victim's family member that the death penalty should not
be invoked.'
Similarly, in Barbour v. State,6 ' the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
held that the trial court had properly excluded from the jury's consideration
a letter from the victim's brother requesting that the defendant be sentenced
to life without parole rather than death.62 The trial court reasoned, in line
with Robison, that the witness's opinion of the appropriate punishment is
not relevant because it is neither evidence of the defendant's character nor
of the circumstances of the crime.63
57. 943 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1991).
58. Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1991).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1217. Michael Vitiello argues:
Robison's counsel might have attempted to introduce testimony that the
execution of the defendant would not ease the pain of family members, but
would increase their suffering. If applied consistently, Payne would make that
evidence admissible in light of its express statement that evidence "about the
imp act of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury 's decision."
Robison suggests other possible cases. For example one can imagine cases in
which a murdier victim has abused his family and rather than causing profound
grief the death has freed the family. If the victim's family members were willing
to admit that, Payne makes that evidence admissible.
Michael Vitiello, Payne v. Tennessee: A 'Stunning Ipse Dixit,"8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 165, 224-25 (1994).
61. 673 So.2d 461 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
62. Barbour v. State, 673 So.2d 461 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
63. Id. at 22-24. In addition to denying evidence of a family member's opposition to
the death penalty, courts have also prohibited the introduction of evidence relating to the
actual victim's opposition to the death penalty. See, e.g., State v. Barone, 969 P.2d 1013 (Or.
1998); Campbell v. State, 679 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1996). In Campbell, a jury convicted James
Bernard Campbell of murder in the first degree, and the jury sentenced him to death. Two
[Vol. 12:2
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V Victim Impact Evidence in Virginia
In virtually every capital case in Virginia, a defendant will be charged
with at least one felony in addition to capital murder. For example, if a
defendant is charged with capital murder under section 18.2-31.4 of the
Virginia Code (willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder in the
commission of robbery or attempted robbery), the defendant will also be
charged with the robbery and with any other relevant felony violations,
such as unlawful use of a firearm. (An example of the rare exceptions to the
generalization that felony charges accompany capital murder charges in
virtually every case would be a murder for hire committed with a knife.)
If convicted of capital murder and at least one felony, the sentencing
proceedings for the felony conviction(s) and the capital murder conviction
are conducted separately.' Sentencing for the conviction of a felony
proceeds according to section 19.2-295.1 and is generally conducted first,
while sentencing for the capital murder proceeds according to 19.2-264.4 and
is generally held after the felony sentencing proceeding.6 Under section
19.2-11.01 of the Virginia Code, victim impact evidence only enters into the
court proceedings after the determination of guilt or innocence has been
made.66 Such evidence takes one of two forms in capital cases: victim
impact evidence can enter into the capital case sentencing proceedings in the
form of a written victim impact statement or as direct victim impact
testimony.7
courts reversed the sentence. At the third sentencing hearing, Sue Zann Bosler, whose victim
impact testimony had helped the prosecution secure a death sentence in the two previous
hearings, told her story in a different way. Determined to save Campbell's life and to honor
her dead father's opposition to the death penalty, she gave her testimony in "as
unsympathetic and undramatic [way] as possible." When asked by the prosecution about her
livelihood, Bosler replied that she had two jobs: one as a hairstylist and one as an advocate
against the death penalty. The judge put a stop to her attempt:
[When she was called back to the stand by the defense, the judge was skeptical
about letting her proceed.... He sent the jury out and ordered Sue Zann to tell
him what slie planned to say. In response, she asserted that she wanted to forgive
James. Moreover, she commenteF "I respect his life and value it here on this
earth, and I believe in life." The judge rulid that such opinions have no place in
the courtroom and are not allowed under Florida law.
Sullivan, supra note 41, 601-02 & nn.12-14 (internal citations omitted). At his third
sentencing proceeding, Campbell was sentenced to life in prison. Id.
64. Sentencing for both felony and capital murder convictions generally occurs in a
separate proceeding from the determination of guilt or innocence. Both are bifurcated
proceedings. VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-295.1, 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1999).
65. Id.
66. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-11.01 (Michie 1999). This is true in both felony and capital
cases.
67. VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-11.01, 19.2-299.1, 19.2-264.4, 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1999).
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A. Victim Impact Statements
Under section 19.2-11.01(A) (4)(b) of the Virginia Code, victims shall be
given the opportunity to prepare a written victim impact statement
pursuant to section 19.2-299.1.68 According to section 19.2-299.1, in all cases
involving offenses other than capital murder, the victim impact statement is
included in the presentence report prepared by a probation officer.69 In
capital murder cases, however, the victim impact statement is included as a
part of the post-sentence report prepared according to section 19.2-264.5.
After the capital sentencing jury has recommended death in a section 19.2-
264.4 capital sentencing proceeding, the court reviews the post-sentence
report prepared by a probation officer of the court, which includes the
victim impact statement, before imposing sentence.7 ' According to section
19.2-264.5, "[a]fter consideration of the report, and upon good cause shown,
the court may set aside the sentence of death and impose a sentence of
imprisonment for life."7' Thus, although a murder victim's family member
shall be given the opportunity to prepare a written victim impact
statement, 2 that statement will never be seen by the sentencing jury.
B. Victim Impact Testimony
In addition to the victim impact statement included in the post-sentence
report under section 19.2-264.5, section 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(c) provides that a
victim's family member shall be given the opportunity to testify prior to
sentencing of the defendant regarding the impact of the crime at the section
19.2-264.4 capital murder sentencing proceeding. Under section 19.2-
11.01(A)(4)(c) however, such opportunity shall be afforded only upon
68. SS 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(b), 19.2-299.1.
69. 5 19.2-299.1. A presentence report is never submitted to the court in a capital case.
Under section 19.2-299.1, a presentence report is only prepared in cases not involving the
offense of capital murder. In all cases involving capital murder, victim impact statements
"shall be prepared and submitted in accordance with the provisions of S 19.2-264.5." Section
19.2-264.5 sets forth the requirements for the post-sentence report to be prepared after the
jury has elected the death penalty. In addition, despite the difference in terminology, neither
the presentence nor post-sentence report is seen by the sentencing jury. Under section 19.2-
299(A), the presentence report is submitted to counsel for the accused, the attorney for the
Commonwealth, and the judge in chambers, "who shall keep the report confidential." VA.
CODE ANN. 5 19.2-299(A) (Michie 1999). The statute states that the probation officer shall
be available to testify from the report in open court "in the presence ofthe accused, who shall
have been advised of its contents and be given the right to cross-examine the investigating
officer as to any matter contained therein and to present any additional facts bearing upon
the matter." Id. Like the post-sentence report described in section 19.2-264.5, the presentence




73. SS 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(a), 19.2-264.
[Vol. 12:2
FORGIVENESS
motion of the Commonwealth.74 Section VI.B.2 of this article will explore
alternative means of introducing victim impact evidence at a section 19.2-
264.4 capital sentencing proceeding and at the judicial imposition of
sentence proceeding that follows.
V. Evidence of Forgiveness Before and After Trial
Despite the seemingly limited opportunity afforded defense counsel for
the introduction of victim impact evidence under section 19.2-11.01 of the
Virginia Code, there are a number of other ways counsel for the defendant
might use such evidence prior to, at, and after, a capital trial.
A. Pre. Trial Use of Forgiveness Evidence
Prosecutors are the "gatekeepers" of the criminal justice system, not
only deciding whether to charge a suspect but determining what crime will
be charged as well.7" Jonathan DeMay notes that "prosecutorial discretion
encompasses the power to charge or refrain from charging an individual
with a crime; to reduce charges to a lesser offense prior to trial; to not
charge prior offenses; to dismiss or request court dismissal after a trial
commences; or to recommend a lesser sentence.""6 While a prosecutor is a
"gatekeeper" of the criminal justice system, he is also the representative of
the state which has been harmed by the crime. In his remarks at a recent
symposium on "The Role of Forgiveness in the Law," David Lerman, an
Assistant District Attorney in Wisconsin, stated:
I believe, first, that forgiveness should be seen as flowing from the
victim, or a surrogate victim or a victim's representative, or from the
neighborhood most affected by aparticular crime. To the extent that a
prosecutor takes on the mantle of the community to effect justice, then
I as a prosecutor may engage in forgiveness.... Otherwise, I think that
what I engage in in p wlea barg ining or lowering a sentence is compassion
or mercy... . You prosecutors are really the hub of the system.
We control so much of what goes on in the criminal justice system;
therefore, I think we play an absolutely vital role in advancing the
notion of forgiveness in criminal justice processes. How should we be
doing that? We should be allowing for practices which advance the
possibility of forgiveness. This is what is most helpful to victims, I be-
lieve.'
74. Id.
75. Jonathan DeMay, A District Attorney's Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penaty:
Toward an Improved Process, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767, 772 (1999).
76. Id.
77. David Lerman, Remarks at "The Role of Forgiveness in the Law" Symposium 65-66
(January 28, 2000) (transcript on file with author).
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Given the power of the prosecutor as the "gatekeeper" of the criminal
justice system and as someone who "takes on the mantle of the
community," a murder victim's family that has a story of forgiveness to tell
might be better served by the prosecutor prior to trial rather than in the
courtroom. The choice is between life imprisonment and death at the
sentencing phase of a capital case, whereas pretrial there is some possibility
of a lesser charge. It seems likely that forgiveness evidence presented to the
prosecutor at this stage in the proceedings, rather than after the trial
commences, could have a potentially greater effect on the treatment the
defendant receives.
Marietta Jaeger, the mother of the seven-year-old girl who was killed
while camping with her family in Montana, sought the help of the
prosecutor in having the life of her daughter's killer spared.7" Jaeger traveled
to Montana to meet with the suspect and to tell him of her forgiveness. She
then met with state prosecutors to tell them of her opposition to any move
on their part to seek the death penalty, even if the suspect confessed."9
When the suspect learned of Jaeger's stance, he broke down and confessed
to four murders including the killing of Jaeger's daughter. One cannot
know whether prosecutors would have honored Jaeger's request that they
not seek the death penalty because the defendant killed himself before he
was charged, four hours after he confessed.80 The point is that Jaeger's
forgiveness of the suspect'prompted her to request a grant of mercy from
the state.
In addition to those acts of mercy on the part of the prosecutor in
charging an offense in response to stories of forgiveness from family
members, similar decisions are made for reasons other than family
forgiveness. The parents of Matthew Shepard made a request that the
prosecutor give the defendant, Aaron McKinney, two life terms in prison
rather than pursue the death penalty if McKinney relinquished his right to
appeal.81 Shephard's father, Dennis Shepard, made an address to the court
after the agreement was concluded. 2 Turning to the defendant, he said:
McKinney, I am going to grant you life, as hard as it is for me to do,
because of Matthew. Every time you celebrate Christmas, a birthday or
78. McClory, supra note 30.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. MichaelJanofsky, DealMeans Life Terms forKiller of Gay Student, HOUS. CHRON.,
Nov. 5, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 24263265 ("Prosecutor Cal Rerucha said he didn't
want the deal at first, but Shepard's family wanted to show tolerance because their son
believed in it. Rerucha also noted that the family won't have to endure years of appeals.");
Robert W. Black, Dendant Gets Life in Gay Killing Plea Deal Matthew Shepard's Parents
Urged Tolerance Because Slain Son Believed in It, A Prosecutor Says, ATLANTA CONST., Nov.




the Fourth of July, remember that Matthew isn't. Every time you wake
up in that prison cell, remember that you had the opportunity and the
ability to stop your actions that night.... You robbed me of something
very precious, and I will never forgive you for that. May you live a long
life, and may you thank Matthew every day for it. 3
In a similar case of mercy without forgiveness, Sy Snarr asked that the
prosecutor spare the life of her son's killer because she and other family
members did not want a "sensational and lengthy capital murder trial.
Instead, they wanted 'closure and to get on with [their] lives."' 4 According
to Snarr, Jorge Martin Bevenuto, her son's killer, committed a
"premeditated, evil act. He wanted to watch someone die. And I'll never
forgive him.""5
In three recent cases in which the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse
provided assistance, prosecutors sought family approval before accepting
pleas that ended the possibility of death for the respective defendants. The
families assented-to the pleas for reasons other than forgiveness. In all of the
cases described above, the prosecutor agreed to a lesser charge or sentence
on the basis of the murder victims' families' wishes, and thus while the
Shepard, Snarr, and the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse stories are
certainly not about forgiveness on the part of the victims' families, they do
illustrate the power of prosecutorial discretion and the power that families
potentially have to effectuate a grant of mercy. Given the current emphasis
in our judicial system on victims' rights, a prosecutor should be equally (if
not more) moved to mercy by a plea for mercy based in forgiveness than a
plea for mercy based in a desire for finality.
In order to use victim impact evidence as a shield in the hands of the
defense rather than a sword in the hands of the prosecution, Randall Coyne
suggests contacting family members before the trial begins: 6 "Although the
family's initial reaction may be to avoid any contact with defense attorneys,
one should not automatically assume that all family members will seek to
have the client killed. Many family members may have strong religious
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While Matthew Shepard's father has
declared that he has not forgiven McKinney, Matthew's mother's motivation for accepting
the plea was reportedly forgiveness. Prosecutor Cal Rerucha stated that he had reservations
about the plea bargain, but that Matthew's mother prevailed upon him to agree to it.
Rerucha said that he "will never get over Judy Shepard's capacity to foigive." Julie Cart,
Killer of Gay Student Is Spared Death Penalty Courts: Matthew Shepard's Father Says Life in
Prison Shows "Mercy to Someone Who Refused to Show Any Mercy,' L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999,
at Al, available in 1999 WL 26209605.
84. Stephen Hunt, Slain Son 'Deserves More Dignity'; Mother Says KillerShouldDie, But
Agrees to Life-Sentence Deal;MotherAccepts Life SentenceforMurderer, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct.
16, 1997, at BI, available in 1997 WL 3430796.
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Randall Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence
During the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 589, 613 (1992).
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beliefs which are more evolved than lex talionis."" According to Coyne,
"[i]nitiating contact with the victim's family may also open a dialogue which
leads to a plea bargain. Obviously, a prosecutor is more likely to negotiate
a plea bargain if the victim's family members agree."88 The point is that if
the family of a victim agrees to a plea of capital life or first degree lifefor any
reason, the prosecutor is freer to negotiate a lesser sentence for the
defendant.
B. Trial Use of Forgiveness Evidence
1. Obtaining Evidence of Forgiveness
One commentator has suggested that the case of Brady v. Maryland89
may be helpful in obtaining potentially favorable victim impact evidence
from the prosecution.' In Brady, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution."  Victor D. Vital asserts that defense counsel may use
Brady to obtain evidence that, inter alia, casts doubt on the loss suffered by
the victim's family because such evidence could be favorable to the defense's
case.
92
2. Using Evidence of Forgiveness at Trial
Difficult though it may seem under section 19.2-11.01 of the Virginia
Code to bring evidence of a victim's family's forgiveness before the court,93
there are three specific arguments defense counsel might make to have such
evidence admitted either in the form of testimony on the part of a forgiving
family member or as a written victim impact statement.
a. Forgiveness Testimony
Given that victims may have the opportunity under section 19.2-11.01
to testify prior to sentencing, and victim impact statements in capital cases
87. Id. (emphasis added). Lex talionis is defined as "the law of retaliation;... an eye
for an eye; a tooth for a tooth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 913 (6th ed. 1990).
88. Coyne, supra note 86, at 613.
89. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
90. Victor D. Vital, Payne v. Tennessee: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence at Capital
Sentencing Trials, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 497, 515 (1994) (citing Vivian Berger, Payne and
Suffering: A Personal Reflection and a Victim.Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U.L. 21, 51
(1992)).
91. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
92. Vital, supra note 90, at 515.
93. See supra section V.
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are presented to the court only after the jury has recommended death,94 it
is clearly to the defense's advantage to introduce forgiveness testimony at
the jury sentencing proceeding. While testimony on the part of a victim's
family member is only upon motion of the Commonwealth pursuant to
section 19.2-11.01, defense counsel can argue that evidence of forgiveness is
relevant as either rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of victim
impact or as mitigation evidence.
Whether or not the Commonwealth presents victim impact evidence
of its own, defense counsel can make the argument that evidence of
forgiveness on the part of the victim's family is relevant as mitigation
evidence. While the issue in Robison v. Maynard and Barbour v. State was
whether evidence that the opinion of a member of the victim's family that
the death penalty should not be invoked was admissible, the issue here is
whether evidence of forgiveness on the part of a victim's family member is
admissible. In Lockett v. Ohio,9 the Supreme Court of the United States
held the following: 
th
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer, in
all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering,
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death."
Several years later, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,' the Court, applying the Lockett
rule, held that "[ijust as the state may not by statute preclude the sentencer
from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to
consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.""8 Mitigation
evidence is "any evidence presented of circumstances which do not justify
or excuse the offense but which in fairness or mercy may extenuate or
reduce the degree of moral culpability and punishment."" In Virginia,
evidence of victim impact is relevant mitigating evidence. Section 19.2-299.1
of the Virginia Code states that the victim impact statement "may be
considered by the court in determining the appropriate sentence."" 0
Evidence that the family of a murder victim has forgiven the defendant is
evidence which may extenuate or reduce the degree of punishment. Thus,
under Lockett and Eddings, such evidence is admissible.
94. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-11.01 (Michie 1999).
95. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
96. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
97. 455 U.S. 104 (1981).
98. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1981).
99. VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL S 33.127 (1999).
100. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-299.1 (Michie 1999).
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Should the Commonwealth decide to present victim evidence of its
own,1"' defense counsel can introduce evidence of forgiveness as rebuttal.0 2
Section 19.2-11.01 of the Virginia Code recognizes as relevant evidence of
victim impact, and thus it must 'also be the case that evidence of lack of
impact, or, more specifically, evidence of recovery from initial adverse
impact derived from extending forgiveness, is relevant as well. Section 19.2-
11.01 begins as follows: "In recognition of the Commonwealth's concern
for the victims and witnesses of crime, it is the purpose of this chapter to
ensure that tbefull impact of crime is brought to the attention of the courts
of the Commonwealth."0 3 Although an understanding of "the full impact"
of one crime might be had by means of testimony of the great impact the
crime had on a family member of the victim, in another case such
understanding might only be had by means of testimony of mitigation of
impact as the result of forgiveness. The forgiveness of a family member is
relevant to an understanding of "the full impact" of the crime, and thus
defense counsel should seek to have it admitted as rebuttal evidence at the
penalty phase of a capital case.
b. Forgiveness Evidence as Part of a Victim Impact Statement
Forgiveness evidence might also enter into the sentencing phase of a
capital murder case as a part of a victim impact statement. As stated above
in Section V, should the jury in a capital case recommend the death penalty
at the section 19.2-264.4 sentencing proceeding, the court must, pursuant to
section 19.2-264.5, consider the post-sentence report, which "shall in all cases
contain a Victim Impact Statement" before imposing sentence."°4 According
to the statute, "[a]fter consideration of the report, and upon good cause
shown, the court may set aside the sentence of death and impose a sentence
of imprisonment for life."' Under the plain language of the statute, all
post-sentence reports must contain a victim impact statement, and thus
evidence of forgiveness may reach the court in this way. However, should
a court interpret the language "a Victim Impact Statement" to mean that the
report must include only one such statement, which may not contain
101. It might be the case in a capital murder proceeding that while some of the victim's
family members have forgiven the defendant, other have not. Such was the situation in both
the Hines family and the Cavazos family. See supra nn.20, 25.
102. In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held
that the petitioner was denied due process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at
least in part, on the basis of confidential information, which was in the presentence report
but which was not disclosed to the petitioner or his counsel, so that the petitioner had no
opportunity to deny or explain it. Id. at 362 (1977).
103. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-11.01 (Michie 1999) (emphasis added).




evidence of forgiveness on the part of the victim's family,"° defense counsel
might also present evidence of forgiveness as constituting the "good cause"
referred to in the final sentence of the statute. While the phrase "upon good
cause shown" has not been construed by a Virginia court, it is clear that this
language permits the defendant to produce evidence showing good cause
why the sentence of death should not be imposed."7 Given that section
19.2-299.1 recognizes the relevancy of victim impact evidence to
sentencing,0 8 it is clear that such evidence might constitute good cause to set
aside the sentence of death and impose a sentence of life imprisonment
instead.
3. Post-Trial Use of Forgiveness Evidence
There is little evidence of mercy at the clemency stage, should that
point be reached in a capital case."° Since 1976, only forty-one death row
inmates have been pardoned for humanitarian reasons in the United
States."0 There are currently 3,625 inmates on death row."' Virginia
governors have commuted only six death sentences on humanitarian
grounds since 1976, and as of April 12, 2000, seventy-six people have been
executed in the Commonwealth.1 2 Despite Maria Hines's public plea that
the Governor be merciful and spare the life of Dennis Wayne Eaton, the
killer of Hines's brother, Eaton was executed on June 19, 1998. Hines was
not allowed to speak at Eaton's clemency hearing.13 In the case of Lonnie
106. This is a difficult reading to make under the plain language of the statute. The most
obvious meaning of the phrase "a victim impact statement" is any victim impact statement
in existence at the time the post-sentence report is prepared. It could be, however, that a
court might interpret this to mean a single victim impact statement, in which case it might
admit a statement from a non-forgiving family member and exclude a statement from a
forgiving family member.
107. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 634 (1999) (finding that defendant
failed to show good cause why the sentence of death should not be imposed).
108. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-299.1 (Michie 1999).
109. Some inmates choose not to ask for clemency. On the clemency process in
Virginia, see the following articles: Brian S. Clarke, In Search of Clemency Procedures We Can
Live With: What Process is Due in Capital Clemency Proceedings After Ohio Adult Parole
Authority v. Woodard?, I1 CAP. DEF. J. 5 (1998); Walter A. MacFarlane, The Clemency
Process in Virginia, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 241 (1993).
110. Death Penalty Information Center, Facts About Clemency (visited April 12, 2000))
< http://www.essential.org/dpic/demency.html > ("Humanitarian reasons include doubts
about the defendant's guilt, questions about the defendant's mental capacity, rehabilitation
of the defendant, or the personal convictions of the governor.").
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Frank Green, Governor Stands as Last Hope for Condemned Killer, RICH. TIMES-




Weeks, the efforts of Jose Cavazos's children to obtain a grant of clemency
were no more successful than was that of Maria Hines.11 4 Weeks was
executed March 16, 2000."5 Governor Gilmore turned down the clemency
petition two hours prior to the execution.116 Governor Gilmore issued the
following statement:
Trooper Jose Cavazos died honorably in the performance of his duties
while protecting the lives of the people of Virginia .... Weeks admitted
to police that he murdered Trooper Cavazos . .. Upon a thorough,
review of the Petition for Clemency, the numerous court decisions
regarding this case, and the circumstances of this matter, I decline to
intervene.117
VI. Conclusion
In seeking to understand the role of forgiveness in capital proceedings,
this article traced the roles of a number of victims' families at different stages
in capital murder cases. It then explored the meaning of the term "forgive-
ness" and distinguished this concept from the related concept of mercy.
This article next examined the state of victim impact evidence law both
nationally and in Virginia specifically. It concludes with an evaluation of
the ways in which forgiveness by a murder victim's family might be used in
defending a capital case in Virginia should such evidence be found. Defense
counsel should first seek to ascertain whether members of the victim's
family have forgiven the defendant. Such evidence might be obtained by
either approaching the family directly or by requesting the evidence pursu-
ant to Brady v. Maryland from the prosecution. Defense counsel in posses-
sion of forgiveness evidence thus has four grounds for arguing for the
admissibility of the evidence: 1) as rebuttal evidence to the prosecution's
introduction of victim impact testimony by a non-forgiving family member;
2) as mitigation evidence; 3) under the plain language of the statute; and 4)
as evidence constituting "good cause" under section 19.2-264.5. Victim's
family members who forgive in the United States do not have the sort of
power that Ali Mohebbi had to trigger automatically the state's grant of
mercy on behalf of Morteza Amini Moqaddam. This does not mean,
however, that they are entirely powerless. There are distinct points at
which victims' stories are heard within our criminal justice system, and
while the evidence of success in bringing about change is not overwhelming,
those stories of forgiveness can save lives.
114. Frank Green, Weeks Dies By Injection Final Words Are Apology to Victim's Family,
Others, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, March 17,2000, at BI, available in 2000 WL 5032941.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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